Introduction
According to Woods (2008 Woods ( : 1221 , there is a silent revolution going on in international development cooperation, with an increasing number of 'new' or 'emerging' donors "quietly offering alternatives to aid-receiving countries." More than 30 donor countries operate outside the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of economically advanced OECD members (Paulo and Reisen 2010) . As a matter of fact, various non-DAC donors are not so new in international development cooperation. Manning (2006: 384) stresses that many of them have "a good deal of experience." Some non-DAC donors have provided aid to Africa for more than half a century now (Kragelund 2008 ).
Yet, the quantitative importance and allocation behavior of these donors is hard to pin down exactly. The OECD reports aggregate net disbursements of non-DAC aid of US$ 26.2 billion during the 2001-2007 period (in current prices). 1 Bilateral aid, the focus of the subsequent analysis, accounted for about 85 percent of this sum. However, information on the distribution of non-DAC aid across recipient countries is scarce. For instance, China does not disclose its aid allocation.
Anecdotal evidence on how alternative sources of aid are spent has provoked a controversial debate on whether such alternatives are a change for the better for international development cooperation, or even the aid recipients. The notion of "rogue aid" (Naím 2007) clearly represents an extreme view, but concerns about the motives underlying the allocation of non-DAC aid are widely shared. Indeed, these concerns are not too different from those well known to scholars of aid allocation by traditional DAC donors.
First of all, new donors are blamed to pursue their own commercial and political interests. Using aid as a means to promote donor exports and getting access to raw materials in recipient countries figures prominently among the former. Woods (2008 Woods ( : 1205 notes that "a quest for energy security, enlarged trading opportunities and new economic partnerships" is common to most non-DAC donors. 2 Second, by granting aid to corrupt and undemocratic regimes, new donors could undermine efforts by traditional donors to grant aid according to merit of recipient countries -even though earlier findings by Alesina and Weder (2002) on the missing link between corruption and traditional aid suggest that there may be little for 1 For details, see Table 33 in various issues of OECD (a). This source provides summary information for various non-DAC donors, but reliable summary data are missing for some countries that are widely believed to be major donors, notably China. Note that Korea joined the DAC in November 2009; given that our period of observation ends in 2008 (see below for details) we include Korea as a non-DAC donor. 2 See also Paulo and Reisen (2010) on the intensified "scramble for extraction rights." According to Kragelund (2008) , some non-DAC donors state officially that the aim of their aid is political rather than altruistic.
non-DAC donors to jeopardize. 3 China is the preferred villain with respect to commercial and political selfishness, but similar charges are also directed at other Asian donors such as India (Manning 2006; Woods 2008) , Arab countries (Villanger 2007) , and Venezuela (Manning 2006; Naím 2007 ).
On the other hand, one might suspect that emerging donors provide better targeted aid than the traditional and more advanced DAC members. Various new donors, including South Korea, have been at the receiving end of foreign aid until recently. Given their own experience on what helped them develop, new donors may have a better understanding of recipient needs, while recipients may be more inclined to take lessons from donors such as Brazil, China, and Korea than adhering to conditions attached to DAC aid. Apart from focusing on particularly poor recipient countries, a needs-based allocation of non-DAC aid may also be reflected in new donors playing an increasingly important role in disaster relief and post-conflict resolution (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005) .
Empirical studies systematically addressing these propositions in a multivariate framework hardly exist. The available evidence is almost exclusively descriptive, with Kragelund (2008) providing a most informative overview covering essentially all non-DAC donors. The econometric study of Neumayer (2003a) represents a notable exception. While
Neumayer's analysis is restricted to Arab donors and does not extend beyond 1997, we assess the aid allocation across recipient countries for a group of 16 non-DAC donors in the more recent past (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . We draw on the newly released PLAID database that offers projectrelated information on the engagement of donors in specific recipient countries.
The data we use are described in more detail in section 2. Section 3 introduces the Probit and Tobit models and presents our empirical results. We find that new donors (i) focus on closer neighbors, (ii) care less for recipient need than old donors, (iii) exhibit a weaker bias towards badly governed countries, (iv) respond to disasters, but with fewer resources than old donors, and (v) do not pursue commercial self interest.
Aid Data and stylized facts
We draw on PLAID version 1.9, released in January 2010, to identify aid activities by non- (Neumayer 2004; Manning 2006) . These labels are rather meant to distinguish these donors from the well documented and thoroughly analyzed aid activities of DAC member countries.
We cover 16 new donors in the following and overall aid commitments by these donors in the order of $6.3 billion in 2001-2008 (in constant prices of 2000) . 4 This figure   clearly understates the aid activities of the donor group under consideration. Coverage over time is far from complete for various donors in the sample (see Table 1 America and the Baltics allocated commitments of less than $1 million annually (Table 1) .
Our sample of new donors is fairly diverse in other respects, too. Arab countries are not only experienced donors, as noted above. In contrast to new donors from other regions, they also form "a quite cohesive group" (Manning 2006: 374) with "substantial co-financing of projects" (Neumayer 2004: 284) . Arab donors may offer lessons on aid harmonization and 4 Note that the OECD presents country allocations of aid disbursements from some non-DAC donors since recently (http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/; accessed: March 2010). In line with Neumayer (2003b) , however, we prefer analyzing aid commitments over which donors have full control. Furthermore, the OECD source does not distinguish between major Arab donors; it does not present any data for various donors listed in Table 1 (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rep. of South Africa, Taiwan and Thailand). Aggregating Arab aid may blur differences in the allocation behavior between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (see below). The lack of data for various small donors reduces the heterogeneity of the sample of new donors considerably. 5 Consequently, Poland and Taiwan are included in our Probit estimations when we focus on whether or not to give aid at all, but have to be dropped in Tobit estimations where the focus is on aid flows. 6 Figures collected by Kragelund (2008: 566) is nine times the annual average reported for the largest non-DAC donor, Kuwait, reported in 
Method and results
We employ two different estimators to test our hypotheses. In the first step we look at donors' decisions to allocate aid to a country at all, while in the second step we look at their decision on the amount of aid to be given once recipients have been selected. For the first step we employ Probit models, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator showing whether or not a particular donor committed aid in any year to a particular country over the period of study. Standard errors are clustered at the donor level. For the second step we assume that the same set of variables determines both whether a country is selected as aid recipient and how much aid is being allocated to that country, and accordingly use the Tobit estimator, again clustering standard errors.
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We focus on the 2001-2008 period and estimate our models employing cross-sections rather than time-series cross-section data. The reason is that aid flows are rather volatile from one year to the other. The variables that we employ below, however, can hardly be assumed to explain this volatility. Rather, we expect them to be able to explain whether a donor is present in a particular country in some years, or the amount of aid committed on average (see also Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh 2006) . In the second step of the regression analysis, we take the annual average of (logged) absolute amounts of aid as donors are more likely to allocate a fixed overall amount of money per country, rather than distributing aid on a per-capita basis (Neumayer 2003b ).
In line with the previous literature on aid allocation, we include a standard set of possible determinants as explanatory variables. First of all, the logged per-capita GDP of recipient countries provides an indicator of need which has repeatedly been shown to shape the distribution of aid. We expect the effects of per-capita GDP to be significantly negative for both old and new donors. Second, we use "control of corruption" (Corruption for short) as presented by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) to measure institutional development, with higher index values indicating less corruption. It is ambiguous a priori whether the effect on aid differs between old and new donors. Some critics suspect that new donors undermine efforts by the donor community to reward good governance (e.g., Naím 2007), but it is also 12 Graphs portraying the geographical distribution of aid by groups of donors are available from the authors on request. 13 For a more detailed discussion of methodological issues related to the aid allocation literature, see Neumayer (2003b) .
well known that old donors are less selective than their rhetoric might make us believe (e.g.,
Alesina and Weder 2002).
Third, we control for (logged) population of recipient countries to capture the oftenreported small country bias. In the second step of the analysis, controlling for population is required as the dependent variable is not in per-capita terms. Fourth, we account for the (logged) distance between capital cities in the recipient and the donor country, assuming that new donors are more likely to give aid to countries that are closer to them. 14 To account for commercial donor interests, we include the share of the donor's overall exports accounted for by a particular recipient country (in percent) as well as a recipient country's endowment of mineral and energy resources, proxied by the depletion of these resources in percent of GNI.
We use averages over the sample period for population and mineral and energy depletion.
Per-capita GDP and corruption might themselves be affected by aid flows so that we take lagged values of these variables from the year 2000. The recipient country's share in the donor's exports might also be endogenous. We employ the average over the 1999-2001 period to smooth the data for annual volatility. The baseline variables will be augmented or replaced by a number of different indicators to test for the robustness of results, as will be detailed below.
We run pooled regressions for all donors, including Germany, Japan, and the United States, rather than performing regressions for each individual donor and comparing the individual results with some benchmark countries. Pooling donors increases our flexibility to statistically test for differences and similarities among donors. Note, however, that we do introduce dummies for each individual donor below; we interact these dummies with our explanatory variables, mirroring individual donor regressions.
Results of pooled regressions
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the marginal effects for our basic specification of the Probit model, at the mean of the explanatory variables. 15 Given that new and old donors are pooled in the same regression, we have to include a dummy for the new donors to account for their lower level of aid as compared to the old donors Germany, Japan, and the United States. In this pooled regression, we test for the overall impact of our explanatory variables on the presence of the donor in a particular recipient country, imposing the (slope) coefficients to be the same among new and old donors. As can be seen, the new donor dummy has the expected negative coefficient and is significant at the one percent level. On average, new donors are almost 70 percent less likely to be present in a recipient country as compared to the three old donors.
The results show that the probability of a donor being present in a recipient country increases with corruption and decreases with resource extraction, at the one percent level of significance. At the ten percent level, donors are more likely to give aid to countries with higher shares in the donor country's exports. Distance, population, and per-capita GDP are all marginally insignificant. Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables to allow checking whether the insignificance of these standard explanatory variables might be due to multicollinearity among them. Control of corruption and per-capita GDP are indeed highly correlated, raising some concern that the insignificance of per-capita GDP is due to the inclusion of the corruption variable. In fact, when we exclude control of corruption, per-capita GDP becomes significant at the one percent level, with the expected negative coefficient (not shown in the table).
In column 2 of To get a more detailed picture of whether and to what extent these findings are driven by the specific choice of explanatory variables out of the larger set of theoretically equally plausible determinants, we collected a substantial number of additional variables. As measures of need, we consider the prevalence of malnutrition (measured as height for age in percent of children under 5), mortality rates of infants (per 1000 children), and the Human Development Index, which provides a broader measure of need by combining life expectancy at birth, literacy rates, school enrolment rates and per-capita GDP. All these measures are closely related to various components of the Millennium Development Goals. In addition, Harmer and Cotterell (2005) provide a detailed account of the increasingly diverse range of official donors involved in crisis-affected countries by granting humanitarian aid in the aftermath of natural disasters. We therefore also collected data on the number of people affected by disasters. More detailed definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics for these variables are provided in the Appendix.
As alternative or additional indicators of institutional quality, we consider voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law, all taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009 Again, more information on these additional variables is provided in the Appendix.
Clearly, when there is no precise guidance by theory on which variables to control for, the choice of variables will to some extent be arbitrary. To minimize the degree of arbitrariness in the present study, we rely on the correlation among the variables of interest to decide on whether to include them in addition to, or as a substitute for the variables already included in the regressions. Note that we are not interested in the effect of a particular variable per se, but in the relative importance of the three different groups of variables (need, merit, and donor interest) on the allocation behavior of donors. Hence, we consider it appropriate to refer to the correlation among variables within the three groups.
As can be seen in Table 3 , all variables related to need are highly correlated with each other. Including them in addition to per-capita GDP thus adds little, as multicollinearity renders it unlikely that we can identify the individual effects of these variables. The relative exception among the variables of need is the (log) number of people affected by disasters, with a correlation with per-capita GDP below 0.45. Turning to the institutional quality variables, Table 3 shows extremely high correlations among the variables taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) . Based on the correlation matrix, we decided to include two additional variables from this group -political rights and the index for fragile states. The correlation among the variables on donor interest is generally lower (see the lower panel of Table 3 ). We thus include UNGA voting on keyvotes and the dummy for shared religion.
Column 3 of Table 2 shows the results when including the additional variables and imposing the impact to be the same for both types of donors, while column 4 shows the interactions with the dummy for new donors. Note that we will use the remaining variables not included in these columns to test for the robustness of our results further below. Columns 5 and 6 replicate the regressions excluding the (additional) variables that prove insignificant at conventional levels. Again focusing on new donors, the results for the standard aid 16 We thank Christopher Kilby for sharing his revision of Voeten and Merdzanovic's (2009) UNGA data.
determinants given in columns 4 and 6 are very similar to those of the base specification in column 2. The only exception is that new donors no longer exhibit a large-country bias. As for the variables added to the regression, only the number of people affected by disaster turns out to have a strongly significant (and positive) impact on aid allocation by the new donors.
This is in accordance with Harmer and Cotterrell's (2005) observation that non-DAC donors play an increasingly important role in humanitarian aid. Table 4 repeats the analysis focusing on aid amounts as dependent variable and using Tobit rather than Probit. We then obtain:
where y ij stands for (log) aid from donor i to recipient country j and x ij refers to the determinants of aid as outlined above; u ij is an iid error term. The coefficient β cannot be interpreted directly in the context of the nonlinear Tobit model. Instead, we are interested in the overall marginal effects of the explanatory variables on E(y ij | x ij ). We calculate them at the mean of the respective covariates using stata's margin command. Note that we have to exclude Poland and Taiwan from the list of new donors as we do not have information on the amounts of aid given by these countries.
The results of column 1 are fairly similar to those in Table 2 In column 2 we interact the explanatory variables with the dummy for new donors.
The results for new donors are qualitatively exactly the same as compared to the Probit results in On the other hand, all new donors are to blame for comparatively week targeting of aid according to recipient need. This is even though a strong variation can be observed in the extent to which individual new donors take recipient need into account. For instance, even within a supposedly homogenous group such as the Arab donors, aid by the United Arab
Results for individual donors
Emirates is biased towards richer countries, whereas the opposite holds for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the poverty orientation of Kuwait's aid comes closest to that of old donors' aid.
Finally, some new donors seem to use aid as a means to promote their exports to recipient countries. According to our Tobit results, this applies to Saudi Arabia as well as all three Latin American donors. At the same time, the Wald tests point to significant differences, at the five percent level, to the benchmark of old donors for three out of these four new donors (Chile is the exception). However, the majority of new donors considered here is no more (or less) commercially motivated to grant aid than the three old donors. 19 Interacting all variables with all dummies at the same time would result in 128 interaction terms (16 countries times 8 variables).
Tests for robustness
We test for the robustness of our results based on the specification of column 6 in Table 4 , employing alternative indicators of need, merit and self-interest. The corresponding regression results are reported in Table 6 . In column 1, the overall aid budget enters as an except civil liberties, however, the conclusion is that old donors honor merit significantly less than the new donors. Finally, using UNGA voting as a proxy for political donor interest (column 12) rather than UNGA voting on keyvotes as above roughly replicates the result in Table 4 , column 4.
Summary and conclusions
An increasing number of actors engage in international development cooperation outside the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of official donors. Some of these 'new'
donors have been blamed for providing "rogue aid" (Naím 2007) Our results strongly suggest that the current debate about the strengths and weaknesses of new aid sources is hardly informed by solid empirical evidence. It is in various respects that aid allocation by new donors differs from traditional patterns. But none of these differences fits easily into the stereotypes characterizing the current debate. Least surprisingly perhaps, almost all new donors in our sample are fairly selective at the gate-keeping stage and favor neighboring countries as recipients. It is true that new donors are more likely to be present in corrupt recipient countries, and they also provide more aid to such recipients.
However, new donors exhibit a weaker, rather than stronger bias towards badly governed countries than the control group of traditional donors. Likewise, we find little reason to blame new donors for using aid as a means to promote commercial self-interest.
On the other hand, the poverty orientation of aid from new donors is clearly weak by DAC standards. This is even though new donors are fairly active in responding to natural disasters, notwithstanding overall budget constraints. However, recipient need as measured by per-capita income, malnutrition and child mortality has a strikingly weak impact on the allocation of aid by new donors. For most new donors, any greater familiarity with recipient need does not translate into needs-based targeting.
All in all, our results challenge both the critics of new donors as well as the optimists expecting better targeted aid from new donors. This is not to ignore the limitations of the present study. We lack data for important new donors such as China and India. Unless these donors become more transparent and release comparable data on their aid allocation, it is hard to tell whether the similarities observed for the present sample would carry over to a still more Poland and Taiwan not listed due to missing aid amounts.
Source: PLAID database; OECD CRS database Notes: Reports marginal effects at the mean of the explanatory variables for old and new donors together (columns 1, 3, 5), and separately (columns 2, 4, 6). The separate effects are based on regressions including interaction terms of all explanatory variables with the new donor dummy. Brackets report p-values for tests of equality between the marginal effects for new and old donors. tstatistics in parentheses; * (**, ***) indicates significance at the ten (five, one) percent level. 
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